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Habeas Corpus in the War Against Terrorism: Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld and Citizen Enemy Combatants 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
On October 11, 2004, Yaser Hamdi arrived home in Saudi Arabia 
after being held incommunicado in U.S. Navy brigs for nearly three 
years.1 Without a hearing and without formal charges ever having been 
filed against him, Hamdi was detained as an “enemy combatant”2 
following his seizure by Afghan allies of the United States, allegedly on 
a battlefield in Afghanistan. Hamdi’s release was part of a settlement 
negotiated by his defense counsel and the U.S. Department of Justice3 
after the United States Supreme Court ruled in his favor on a writ of 
habeas corpus petition filed by his father.4
In times of national crisis civil liberties are sometimes abridged in 
exchange for greater security.5 The Framers, countenancing such an 
 1. U.S.-Freed ‘Combatant’ Is Returned to Saudi Arabia, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at A8; 
Jerry Markon, Father Denounces Hamdi’s Imprisonment; Son Posed No Threat to U.S., He Says, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2004, at A4. 
 2. “There is some debate as to the proper scope of this term, and the Government has never 
provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such. . . . [F]or 
purposes of this case . . . [Hamdi] is an individual who . . . was ‘part of or supporting forces hostile 
to the United States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed conflict 
against the United States’ there.” The Court limited itself to the question “whether the detention of 
citizens falling within that definition is authorized.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 
(2004). See also, Jason Binimow, Annotation, Designation as Unlawful or Enemy Combatant, 185 
A.L.R. FED. 475 (2004). 
 3. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Statement of Mark Corallo, Director of Public 
Affairs, Regarding Yaser Hamdi, #640, Sept. 22, 2004 at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/Septem 
ber/04_opa_640.htm. See also U.S.-Freed ‘Combatant’ Is Returned to Saudi Arabia, supra note 1, at 
A8 (Hamdi’s settlement required him to relinquish his U.S. citizenship, remain in Saudi Arabia for 
five years, renounce terrorism, agree not to sue the U.S. for his imprisonment, and bars him from 
ever traveling to Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, or Syria); Eric Lichtblau, U.S., Bowing to Court 
Ruling, Will Free ‘Enemy Combatant,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at A1. 
 4. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2638. Two similar cases were decided at the same time: Rumsfeld v. 
Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, (2004), and Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). These cases will not be 
discussed at length here because Rumsfeld v. Padilla was decided on a jurisdictional question and 
did not reach the habeas issue, and Rasul v. Bush involved an alien habeas petitioner; this Note 
focuses on the application of habeas corpus to citizen enemy combatants of the War Against 
Terrorism. 
 5. See, e.g., Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648 (“Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of 
great importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But it is equally vital that our 
calculus not give short shrift to the values that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is 
American citizenship.”); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 714 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The Constitution 
envisions grave national emergencies and contemplates significant domestic abridgements of 
individual liberties during such times.”), rev’d, 124 S. Ct.  2711 (2004); cf. Steven R. Shapiro, 
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eventuality, granted to Congress the power to suspend the right to a writ 
of habeas corpus in times of rebellion or invasion.6 In Hamdi’s case, 
Congress had not suspended habeas corpus, though it had authorized the 
president to use military power against terrorists and their allies.7 Yet the 
executive sought to curtail Hamdi’s access to habeas corpus by 
classifying him as an enemy combatant, thereby subjecting him to 
executive discretion instead of domestic criminal law with all of its 
attendant constitutional protections. Hamdi’s petition and the 
government’s arguments supporting his detention led to questions about 
separation of powers and the protection of civil liberties in times of 
national threat. In such times the public desire for security spikes, and 
officials charged with the public’s safety will feel either pressure to 
guarantee security at all costs or be tempted to exploit the public fear to 
their own political or ideological ends.8
It is the function of the judiciary to stand as a bulwark against the 
people’s representatives when public fear and outrage compel or allow 
measures that contravene or undermine core constitutional principles.9 
This responsibility is most effectively fulfilled when the courts use 
conflicts like Hamdi’s as opportunities to reiterate or pronounce bright-
line legal rules that make the boundaries of proper government action 
Defending Civil Liberties in the War on Terror: The Role of the Courts in the War Against 
Terrorism: A Preliminary Assessment, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 103, 103 (2005) 
(“Unsurprisingly, many of our nation’s most shameful civil liberties violations have occurred during 
war or under a perceived threat of war.”). 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see generally Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Power to Suspend 
Habeas Corpus: An Answer from the Arguments Surrounding Ex parte Merryman, 34 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 11 (2004) (presenting the debate about whether the executive may also suspend habeas corpus 
in times of emergency, and concluding that excluding the president from that power is an important 
structural limitation that protects civil liberties). 
 7. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 
(2001) (“In General.—That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by 
such nations, organizations or persons.”). 
 8. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165 (1963) (“The imperative necessity for 
safeguarding . . . rights to procedural due process under the gravest of emergencies has existed 
throughout our constitutional history, for it is then, under the pressing exigencies of crisis, that there 
is the greatest temptation to dispense with fundamental constitutional guarantees which, it is feared, 
will inhibit government action.”); see also Jennifer M. Hannigan, Comment, Playing Patriot Games: 
National Security Challenges Civil Liberties, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1371, 1375 (2004) (citing Justice 
Brennan’s factors outlining the motivation to infringe civil liberties during times of crisis: the 
national fervor that leads to an exaggeration of the security risks that supposedly would result from 
full exercise of civil liberties; the public’s willingness to accept abridgements of its liberties in 
exchange for more security in the face of the exaggerated risks; and the inexperience (or, I would 
add, self-serving calculations) of decisionmakers who are unwilling or unable to scrutinize the crisis 
and distinguish legitimate risks from hyperbole). 
 9. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison). 
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clear for citizenry and public officials alike. Hamdi’s petition was an 
opportunity for the Court to reinforce, in a time of crisis, the fundamental 
liberty of corporal freedom that habeas corpus guarantees by construing 
the Constitution’s separation of powers strictly instead of subjectively. 
Unfortunately, the plurality’s balancing test failed to do so in three 
significant ways: (1) it failed to clarify the separation of powers of the 
three branches of federal government; (2) it failed to protect adequately 
the rights guaranteed by habeas corpus doctrine; and (3) it failed to create 
clarity and predictability for citizen detainees. The Court should have 
resolved the debate with a strict interpretation of habeas corpus doctrine 
and other constitutional principles, rather than a nebulous balancing test 
that accommodates Congress’s avoidance of political responsibility 
while indulging the president’s military power. 
Even though Hamdi is limited to detainees classified as enemy 
combatants it puts all citizens at risk. The War Against Terrorism is 
clearly not a conventional war and the terrorist enemy is not readily 
apparent. Activities ranging from political activism to library and internet 
usage to travel can raise red flags to security and intelligence officers 
putting anyone, however innocent, under the national security 
microscope. Moreover, because of the religious and racial factors 
involved in Middle Eastern terrorism, certain minority populations are 
more likely to be targeted for government action, whether it is justified 
or not. The implication is that this war will be fought internally as much 
as abroad, making everyone a potential suspect that could be classified as 
an enemy combatant and treated according to Hamdi. Furthermore, there 
is no identifiable end to this war and the adjustments made by the 
American public will be in place for a long time, and may become 
permanent either because the War Against Terrorism will be 
interminable, or through the force of habit, tradition, and precedent. To 
avoid abuses in the zealous prosecution of this war the perimeters of 
executive power must be drawn clearly, strictly enforced, and 
fundamental liberties jealously guarded. 
 
II.  HAMDI V. RUMSFELD 
 
A.  Background 
 
The U.S. Constitution forbids the suspension of a citizen’s right to a 
writ of habeas corpus “unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it.”10 The placement of this clause within 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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Article I places suspension within the power of Congress when it is 
deemed necessary.11 The implementation of habeas corpus and the 
procedure for its invocation are codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Section 
2241(a) and (b) place jurisdiction over petitions for the writ in the 
Supreme Court as a forum of first resort, as well as in the federal 
courts.12 Section 2241(c) defines the proper petitioner for a writ of 
habeas corpus.13 Section 2241(d) creates federal court habeas jurisdiction 
over petitioners from State custody.14
The first serious challenge to executive authority over citizen enemy 
combatants arose from a habeas corpus petition following the Civil War. 
President Lincoln had suspended habeas corpus in September 1863 
pursuant to an act of Congress authorizing suspension upon the 
president’s determination.15 Ex parte Milligan16 followed the 
 11. See Jackson, supra note 6 (concluding that, although the Constitution is not explicit in 
giving the power of suspension solely to Congress and thus excluding the President, structural 
considerations and judicial precedent make it clear that the President cannot suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus). 
 12. 28 U.S.C. § 2441(a)-(b) (2000) states: 
Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the 
district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a 
circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the 
restraint complained of is had. The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit 
judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer 
the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to 
entertain it. 
 13. 28 U.S.C. § 2441(c) (2000) states: 
The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless— (1) He is in custody 
under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before 
some court thereof; or (2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an 
Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the 
United States; or (3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of 
the United States; or (4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in 
custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, 
protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order or sanction of any foreign 
state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of 
nations; or (5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial. 
 14. 28 U.S.C. § 2441(d) (2000) states: 
Where an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person in custody under 
the judgment and sentence of a State court of a State which contains two or more Federal 
judicial districts, the application may be filed in the district court for the district wherein 
such person is in custody or in the district court for the district within which the State 
court was held which convicted and sentenced him and each of such district courts shall 
have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application. The district court for the district 
wherein such an application is filed in the exercise of its discretion and in furtherance of 
justice may transfer the application to the other district court for hearing and 
determination. 
 15. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 104 (President Lincoln actually suspended the writ without first 
obtaining congressional authorization. Congress later granted authorization after the decision in Ex 
parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487), which held that the Constitution only 
allows Congress to suspend habeas corpus.). 
 16. 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866). 
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reinstatement of habeas corpus at the close of the war. Milligan, a 
civilian, was charged with complicity with the Confederacy as a result of 
his attempts to undermine Union war efforts in Indiana. He was tried by 
a military court and sentenced to death.17 Although the district court in 
Milligan recognized the special circumstances of insurrection, it held that 
constitutional principles such as due process could not be negated by 
national emergency.18 The court held that since Milligan was a citizen of 
a loyal state in which the courts were open throughout the war, the 
military commission that condemned him had no jurisdiction over him.19
In Ex parte Quirin, a World War II case involving German saboteurs 
who disembarked from submarines in New York and Florida, the 
military commission that tried the saboteurs sentenced them to death.20 
The Supreme Court held that the president’s war powers conferred 
jurisdiction over enemy combatants upon the executive branch.21 In his 
application for a writ of habeas corpus, one of the defendants argued that 
his U.S. citizenship entitled him to more stringent due process 
protections, specifically the right to a jury trial.22 The Court denied his 
application, holding that his status as an “unlawful combatant” placed 
him squarely within the purview of military tribunals and no right to jury 
trial existed there.23 The Court distinguished Milligan upon the Quirin 
defendants’ admission to being unlawful combatants as opposed to 
Milligan’s status as a civilian together with the uncertainty about the 
charges leveled against him.24
While the doctrine of habeas corpus is well developed, it is unclear 
how habeas corpus applies to enemy combatants who are also U.S. 
citizens. Prior to Hamdi, “[t]he Supreme Court decided the most nearly 
applicable case, Quirin, on stipulated facts, never considering what 
factual demonstration was required.”25 This condition was probably due, 
 17. Id. at 107. 
 18. Id. at 120-21 (“The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, 
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all 
times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever 
invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great 
exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism . . . .”). 
 19. Id. at 121-22 (Martial jurisdiction “can never be applied to citizens in states which have 
upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process 
unobstructed. . . . [N]o usage of war could sanction a military trial there for any offerce [sic] 
whatever of a citizen in civil life, in nowise connected with the military service.”). 
 20. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 21. Id. at 11. 
 22. Id. at 24. 
 23. Id. at 15-16. 
 24. Id. at 19. 
 25. Steven R. Swanson, Enemy Combatants and the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 35 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 939, 1004 (Fall 2003). 
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in part, to the paucity of cases involving citizen enemy combatants and, 
in part, to the finite durations of most of America’s wars. The War 
Against Terrorism presents the courts with a new dilemma: what if the 
citizen enemy combatant was taken during a nontraditional war that has 
no end in sight? Thus, when citizen detainees of the War Against 
Terrorism, like Hamdi, disputed their designation as enemy combatants, 
the federal courts found themselves between a rock and a hard place—
between the government’s security and military interests and the 
detainee’s compelling interest in avoiding indefinite, perpetual, and 
potentially unjustified detention—without clear precedent to determine 
the outcome. 
Each court faced with the issue came to a different conclusion. The 
Eastern District of Virginia determined that core American constitutional 
principles trump the government’s unproven interest in detaining 
Hamdi.26 The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, weighed the balance 
differently.27 The Supreme Court then applied the problem to its own 
scales and came up with yet a third result. Similar discrepancies can be 
found in the José Padilla court decisions28 and the executive’s decision to 
prosecute John Walker Lindh under the traditional criminal justice 
system.29
 26. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 536 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“We must protect the 
freedoms of even those who hate us, and that we may find objectionable. If we fail in this task, we 
become victims of the precedents we create. We have prided ourselves on being a nation of laws 
applying equally to all and not a nation of men who have few or no standards . . . . We must preserve 
the rights afforded to us by our Constitution and laws for without it we return to the chaos of a rule 
of men and not of laws. Our Constitution was the first to develop a government of checks and 
balances . . . . While the Executive may very well be correct that Hamdi is an enemy combatant 
whose rights have not been violated, the Court is unwilling, on the sparse facts before it to find so at 
this time on the basis of the Mobbs Declaration.”), rev’d, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 124 
S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
 27. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The safeguards that all 
Americans have come to expect in criminal prosecutions do not translate neatly to the arena of 
armed conflict. . . . For there is a ‘well-established power of the military to exercise jurisdiction over 
members of the armed forces, those directly connected with such forces, and enemy belligerents, 
prisoners of war, and others charged with violating the laws of war.’ As we emphasized in our prior 
decision, any judicial inquiry into Hamdi’s status as an alleged enemy combatant in Afghanistan 
must reflect this deference as well as ‘a recognition that government has no more profound 
responsibility’ than the protection of American citizens from further terrorist attacks.”), vacated, 124 
S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (citations omitted). 
 28. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that the AUMF did not 
authorize the resident to detain American citizens, as required by the Non-Detention Act (18 U.S.C. 
§ 4001(a) (2001)), and that the constitution does not extend the executive’s war powers to cover the 
detention of citizens as enemy combatants without any kind of process), rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 2711 
(2004). 
 29. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002). Lindh was taken in 
Afghanistan under practically identical circumstances as Hamdi. 
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B.  Facts and Procedure 
 
One week after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New 
York City and Washington, D.C., Congress passed a joint resolution 
entitled Authorization to Use Military Force (“AUMF”), authorizing the 
president to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed or aided the terrorist attacks.”30 Nearly four weeks later, 
combat operations in Afghanistan commenced.31 Yaser Hamdi was 
captured by the Northern Alliance in December 2001.32 He was 
surrendered to U.S. forces which detained and interrogated him in 
Afghanistan.33 In January of 2002, Hamdi was transferred to the U.S. 
naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba and subjected to further 
interrogation. Upon confirmation that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen, he was 
transferred in April of 2002 to a naval brig in Virginia, and then later to a 
similar facility in South Carolina.34 In June of 2002, Hamdi’s father filed 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of Virginia.35
 
1.  Hamdi’s petition for writ of habeas corpus 
 
Hamdi’s petition claimed his detention was not legally authorized.36 
The AUMF did not suspend habeas corpus, and Hamdi had not been 
charged with any crime nor afforded any process.37 Specifically, the 
petition requested that the court: 
 
(1) appoint counsel for Hamdi; (2) order [the government] to cease 
interrogating him; (3) declare that he is being held in violation of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) . . . “schedule an evidentiary 
hearing, at which [the government might] adduce proof in support of 
[its] allegations”; and (5) order that Hamdi be released from his 
“unlawful custody.”38
 30. Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 7. 
 31. See, e.g., Mark Skertic, U.S., Britain Launch Attack on Afghanistan, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
Oct. 8, 2001, at 3. 
 32. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635 (2004). 
 33. Id. at 2636. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.; see generally 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2004). 
 36. Brief for Petitioners/Appellees at 9, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(No. 02-6895). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2636 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 
2002)). The original petition filed by Hamdi’s father and Frank Dunham, the Federal Public 
Defender, could not be obtained. 
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The district court appointed counsel and ordered the government to allow 
Hamdi the same access to counsel as is normally accorded to criminal 
defendants.39
 
2.  Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
Upon the government’s appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals40 
reversed the order, holding that Hamdi was a special case - one that 
required greater deference to the executive because of the associated 
threats to national security and impairment of the government’s efforts to 
gather counter-terrorist intelligence.41 In essence, the Fourth Circuit’s 
reasoning employed its own balancing test, weighing the national 
security interests of the government against Hamdi’s personal liberty 
interest. 
Acknowledging that this was no ordinary criminal case, the appellate 
court held that traditional constitutional deference to the executive in 
“sensitive matters of foreign policy, national security, or military affairs” 
should have slowed the district court’s nearly automatic employment of 
the habeas routine.42 The court observed that there was “little indication 
in the order . . . that the [district court] gave proper weight to national 
security concerns,” and instructed the lower court to consider “the most 
cautious procedures first” upon remand.43
On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit also denied the government’s 
motion to dismiss the petition altogether.44 The government argued that 
the executive’s designation of Hamdi as an enemy combatant put him 
beyond the reach of judicial review.45 This was due to the military and 
national security nature of Hamdi’s detention which gave rise to the 
deference owed to the executive in such matters. The Fourth Circuit 
rejected the government’s expansive interpretation, holding that “with no 
meaningful judicial review, any American citizen alleged to be an enemy 
combatant could be detained indefinitely without charges or counsel on 
 39. See Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 281. 
 40. Id. This case is known as “Hamdi II.” “Hamdi I,” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th 
Cir. 2002), dismissed a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by a public defender and a private 
citizen neither of which had any relationship with Hamdi, thereby failing the “next friend” 
requirement. 
 41. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 281. 
 42. Id. (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 
(1936)). 
 43. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 282, 284. 
 44. Id. at 283. 
 45. Id.; Brief for Respondents/Appellants at 28, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 
2002) (No. 02-6895). 
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the government’s say-so.”46 The Fourth Circuit’s decision changed the 
issue to how much judicial protection habeas petitioners could expect 
once they had been classified as enemy combatants by the executive 
branch.47
 
3.  The government’s argument 
 
On remand, the government conceded the judiciary’s jurisdiction 
over habeas corpus petitions of citizen enemy combatants.48 It also 
adjusted its judicial deference argument; instead of asserting that the 
executive’s detention of citizen enemy combatants was immune from 
judicial review, the government argued that such review was 
substantially limited by the deference owed to the executive in matters of 
national security and military affairs to the question of whether a 
detention was authorized.49 Accordingly, the only evidence provided by 
the government to support Hamdi’s detention was a declaration by 
Michael Mobbs (“Mobbs Declaration”), a Special Advisor to the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, that Hamdi was an enemy combatant. 
Mobbs supported his conclusion by claiming to be familiar with the facts 
and circumstances related to the capture and detention of Hamdi by 
virtue of his review of “relevant records and reports.”50 This hearsay, the 
government argued, was sufficient to satisfy judicial oversight and the 
requirements of due process because of the national security context.51 
The government asserted, therefore, that Hamdi’s detention was legal 
and the habeas petition should be dismissed.52
 
4.  The Supreme Court of the United States 
 
The district court found the Mobbs Declaration woefully inadequate 
to the task of judicial review and rejected the government’s expansive 
interpretation of the deference owed by the judiciary.53 As it engaged in 
 46. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283. 
 47. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 48. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 528 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“In this Court’s hearing 
on the matter on August 13, 2002, the Respondents conceded that their determination of Hamdi’s 
status was subject to judicial review.”), rev’d, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 124 S. Ct. 
2633. 
 49. Brief for Respondents/Appellants at 13-18, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 
2002) (No. 02-6895). 
 50. Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 533. 
 51. Brief for Respondents/Appellants at 13-18, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 
2002) (No. 02-6895). 
 52. Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d. at 528. 
 53. Id. at 535 (“If the Court were to accept the Mobbs Declaration as sufficient justification 
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the balancing process mandated by the Fourth Circuit,54 the district court 
found that the government failed to provide evidence sufficiently 
weighty for dismissal,55 and repeated its order to the government to 
produce proper evidence for in camera review.56 Into the Fourth Circuit 
for the second time, the government’s appeal stressed the executive’s 
need for wide latitude and discretion in its war-making powers, a 
position with which the Fourth Circuit agreed.57 The appellate court 
accepted the Mobbs Declaration as sufficient to justify the government’s 
position by weighing national security more heavily and Hamdi’s liberty 
interest less than the district court did,58 and finding a distinction 
between detention authorized by the executive’s enforcement of criminal 
law and detention under its war powers function.59 The court held, 
therefore, that there was no justification for any further factual inquiry 
and remanded with an order to dismiss the petition.60
Dismissal of the case and the subsequent denial of rehearing61 led 
Hamdi to appeal to the United States Supreme Court. In a plurality 
decision, the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s dismissal and 
remanded.62 The plurality consisted of four justices: Justice O’Connor, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. Justices 
Souter and Ginsburg concurred, to secure the minimum of constitutional 
protections for Hamdi in the case’s outcome, but denied that the 
president had even been authorized to detain him.63 Justices Scalia and 
Stevens dissented by applying habeas doctrine strictly, and Justice 
Thomas’s dissent accepted the government’s position without 
for detaining Hamdi in the present circumstances, then it would in effect be abdicating any 
semblance of the most minimal level of judicial review. In effect, this Court would be acting as little 
more than a rubber-stamp.”). 
 54. Id. at 530 (“This case represents the delicate balance that must be struck between the 
Executive’s authority in times of armed conflict and the procedural safeguards that our Constitution 
provides for American citizens detained in the United States.”). 
 55. Id. at 535. 
 56. Id. at 528. 
 57. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 
(2004). 
 58. Id. at 477 (“Judicial review does not disappear during wartime, but the review of 
battlefield captures in overseas conflicts is a highly deferential one.”). 
 59. Id. at 473. 
 60. Id. at 476. 
 61. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 62. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2652 (2004). 
 63. Id. at 2660 (“Because I find Hamdi’s detention forbidden by [the Non-Detention Act] and 
unauthorized by the Force Resolution, I would not reach any questions of what process he may be 
due . . . . Since this disposition does not command a majority of the Court, however, the need to give 
practical effect to the conclusions of eight members of the Court rejecting the Government’s position 
calls for me to join with the plurality in ordering remand on terms closest to those I would impose.”). 
   




C.  Justice O’Connor’s Opinion for the Plurality 
 
The threshold issue for the plurality was whether detention of citizen 
enemy combatants had been authorized. Hamdi challenged the legality of 
his detention citing 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), the Non-Detention Act, which 
states, “No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the 
United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”  The plurality 
rejected his argument, concluding that the AUMF’s authorization to use 
all “necessary and appropriate” force included the power to detain 
individuals taken in combat “for the duration of the particular conflict in 
which they were captured” because it “is so fundamental and accepted an 
incident to war.”65 Justice O’Connor reiterated the Quirin finding that 
“there is no bar” to the U.S. holding one of its citizens as an enemy 
combatant.66 Although the plurality sympathized with Hamdi’s concern 
about the indefinite nature of his detention, agreeing that Congress had 
not authorized indefinite detention and that international law allows 
detention only for the duration of hostilities, it was deemed irrelevant to 
the authorization question since active combat in Afghanistan was 
concurrent with the Court’s deliberations.67
Justice O’Connor distinguished Milligan from Hamdi on the 
condition of the habeas petitioners upon capture. Milligan was arrested 
by the military in his own home in Indiana as a civilian. By contrast, 
Hamdi was allegedly taken on the field of battle in Afghanistan carrying 
a weapon against coalition soldiers (the Northern Alliance). This, 
reasoned Justice O’Connor, made Hamdi more analogous to Haupt, the 
defendant in Quirin.68 Indeed, the plurality opinion makes much of 
Hamdi’s seizure in a foreign combat zone in finding executive detentions 
of citizen enemy combatants legitimate.69
Having found the AUMF and Quirin to satisfy the threshold issue of 
whether detention was authorized, Justice O’Connor next considered the 
“question of what process is constitutionally due to a citizen who 
 64. Doubt remains, therefore, not only in the outcomes of individual cases of citizen enemy 
combatant habeas petitioners, but also about the Court’s use of this balancing test itself since five of 
the nine justices explicitly opposed Justice O’Connor’s rationale. 
 65. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640-41 (holding that “[i]n light of these principles, it is of no 
moment that the AUMF does not use specific language of detention”). 
 66. Id. at 2640. 
 67. Id. at 2641-42. 
 68. Id. at 2642. This is an odd analogy since Haupt was captured on the continental U.S. 
which was never a combat zone during World War II. 
 69. Id. at 2643. 
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disputes his enemy-combatant status.”70 Both the government and Hamdi 
conceded that, “absent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains 
available to every individual detained within the United States,” and that 
the writ had not been suspended. 71 Justice O’Connor asserted that the 
writ of habeas corpus statute is clear in providing habeas petitioners with 
an opportunity to challenge the facts used by the government to justify 
their detention, and that the courts have some discretion within the 
mandates of due process as to how this can be achieved.72 She rejected, 
therefore, the government’s assertion that the Mobbs Declaration alone 
fulfilled Hamdi’s right to due process.73 Additionally, the Court rejected 
the Fourth Circuit’s holding that Hamdi’s status as an enemy combatant 
was undisputed as a matter of law by virtue of his capture in a foreign 
combat zone: “the circumstances surrounding Hamdi’s seizure cannot in 
any way be characterized as ‘undisputed’ as ‘those circumstances are 
neither conceded in fact, nor susceptible to concession in law, because 
Hamdi has not been permitted to speak for himself or even through 
counsel as to those circumstances.”74 On the other hand, the vigorous 
habeas order of the district court was likewise rejected as not being 
sufficiently delicate in accommodating the government’s concerns.75
To balance these competing interests, Justice O’Connor 
compromised between the extremes proposed by the parties. Hamdi 
requested a full habeas hearing with unfettered access to counsel.76 The 
government argued that the “some evidence” standard77 of the Fourth 
Circuit should suffice. The plurality settled upon the Mathews balancing 
test, by which “the process due in any given instance is determined by 
weighing ‘the private interest that will be affected by the official action’ 
against the Government’s asserted interest . . . .”78 Though articulated 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 2644. 
 72. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000). 
 73. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648. Although the plurality later stated that hearsay like the Mobbs 
Declaration might be acceptable as the most reliable evidence available, id. at 2649, this would be 
insufficient in the absence of neutral judicial review of the detainee’s rebuttal to that evidence. 
 74. Id. at 2644 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 337 F.3d 335, 357 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) 
(Luttig, J., dissenting)). 
 75. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648 (“[N]either the process proposed by the Government nor the 
process apparently envisioned by the District Court below strikes the proper constitutional 
balance . . . .”). 
 76. Brief for Petitioners at 9-12, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696). 
 77. The “some evidence” standard, adopted by the Fourth Circuit in its dismissal of Hamdi’s 
petition, called for the court’s focus to be “‘exclusively on the factual basis supplied by the 
Executive to support its own determination’” and “‘does not require’ a ‘weighing of the evidence,’ 
but rather calls for assessing ‘whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the 
conclusion.’” Id. at 2645 (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 34, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 
2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696)). 
 78. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2646 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
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differently, this test is essentially the same as that employed by the 
district court and by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Like the lower 
courts before it, the plurality weighed Hamdi’s interest in freedom from 
bodily restraint against the government’s interest, including “the burdens 
the Government would face in providing greater process.”79 For Hamdi, 
the Court considered the “interest of the erroneously detained individual” 
in preserving his liberty,80 preventing oppression and abuse of innocents 
by checking the executive’s power of detention, preserving the checks 
and balances of American government generally, and reaffirming the 
fundamental right of a citizen “to be free from involuntary confinement 
by his own government without due process of law . . . .”81 Finding the 
protection of these rights significant, the plurality concluded that the 
exigencies of war and national security did not completely override 
Hamdi’s private interest.82
On the other hand, the plurality did not ignore the government’s 
interests in national security and in the interrogation of Hamdi. The 
Court also recognized the burdens that full due process would place on 
the government’s war-making abilities. Finding significant weight on 
this side of the scales, the plurality was unwilling to mandate the full 
criminal process that would normally follow a successful habeas petition. 
The balance that the plurality struck was to create what it called 
“basic process.”83 “Basic process” retains fundamental protections that 
the Court determined to be “core elements;” citizen-detainees are entitled 
to “notice of the factual basis for [their] classification” as enemy 
combatants, and to “a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual 
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”84 On the other hand, “basic 
process” does not guarantee other protections normally afforded in 
criminal due process, and can, therefore, be “tailored to alleviate [the] 
uncommon potential burden on the Executive” of citizen-combatant 
proceedings.85 The plurality provided examples of where “basic process” 
might deviate from normal criminal due process. For example, normally 
inadmissible hearsay, such as the Mobbs Declaration, might be allowed, 
or a rebuttable “presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence” 
would shift the burden of proof to the habeas petitioner and away from 
the executive. 86 Justice O’Connor also mentioned the possible use of 
 79. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2646. 
 80. Id. at 2647. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 2646-47. 
 83. Id. at 2649. 
 84. Id. at 2648-49. 
 85. Id. at 2649. 
 86. Id. 
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military tribunals in lieu of conventional civilian jury trials (with a caveat 
to the executive that civilian courts would be open to a habeas petitioner 
in the absence of process afforded by military tribunals).87 With this 
balance the plurality believed it had satisfied the most important aspects 
of both competing interests. 
In summary, the plurality held that citizen enemy combatants who 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus are entitled to confront the allegations 
against them before a neutral decisionmaker. Any further protections of 
due process, however, are to be balanced against the executive’s national 
security interests and war-making powers with the deference traditionally 
accorded those interests. This balance may lead to a lowered standard of 
due process, stripped of all but the “essential constitutional promises,”88 
than would be expected by a traditional application of habeas corpus 
doctrine. 
 
D.  Justice Souter’s Concurrence 
 
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, would have ordered 
Hamdi’s release. He concluded that the government had “not made out a 
case on any theory,” because it had not even met the threshold question 
of authorization to detain Hamdi.89 For Justice Souter, the real threshold 
issue was “how broadly or narrowly to read the Non-Detention Act.”90 
The government argued that the act does not apply to military detentions 
in wartime,91 or, alternatively, that the statutory requirement was 
satisfied by the AUMF.92 Justice Souter determined that the act’s 
legislative history required a strict reading and consequently rejected 
both arguments. 
Justice Souter noted that the Non-Detention Act was passed in 
conjunction with the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950, 
which gave the Attorney General broad discretionary power to detain 
citizens in times of emergency.93 Congress did so with the express intent 
of preventing another episode like the forceful internment of thousands 
of innocent and loyal Japanese-Americans during World War II.94 It 
 87. Id. at 2651. The issue remains, however, as to whether the executive has been authorized 
to create military tribunals for citizen enemy combatants. See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
 88. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2649. 
 89. Id. at 2655. 
 90. Id. at 2654; 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a). 
 91. Brief for Respondents at 21, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696). 
 92. Id. at 20. 
 93. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2654. 
 94. Id.; see generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the 
conviction of a Japanese-American for entering an area the executive had declared off-limits to 
citizens with Japanese ancestors, by deferring to the executive’s security and war-making 
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hoped to preclude that possibility not only by withdrawing the 
executive’s authority, but also by requiring Congress to set forth clearly 
the exact perimeter of the executive’s power before any detentions could 
be made.95 A broad reading of the statute - endorsed by the government 
and adopted by the plurality - would undermine this purpose by allowing 
authorization to be implied where none is explicitly stated.96 
Furthermore, Justice Souter argued, strict construction of the Non-
Detention Act is mandated by precedent as well as by the legislative 
history.97
Justice Souter concluded that the Non-Detention Act does apply to 
military detentions during wartime. Looking at the historical context that 
motivated the enactment of the Non-Detention Act, he concluded that it 
was especially applicable to times of crisis and national emergency, such 
as war.98 Refuting the government’s assertion that the act applies only to 
the domestic criminal code and not to military detentions,99 Justice 
Souter observed that the legislative history clearly indicates that 
Congress contemplated that the bill “would sweep beyond imprisonment 
for crime and apply to executive detention in furtherance of wartime 
security” and intended as much.100
Under strict construction, Justice Souter found that the AUMF did 
not authorize Hamdi’s detention because “it never so much as uses the 
word detention,” and there would be no reason for Congress to imply 
more power than was explicitly granted by the resolution “given the 
well-stocked statutory arsenal of defined criminal offenses covering the 
gamut of actions that a citizen sympathetic to terrorists might 
commit.”101 Justice Souter concluded that Congress intended to preclude 
any detention not explicitly sanctioned by a congressional act, fearing 
that it “might leave citizens subject to arbitrary executive action, with no 
clear demarcation of the limits of executive authority.”102 Because 
Congress’s precise intent was “to preclude reliance on vague 
congressional authority . . . as authority for detention or imprisonment at 
the discretion of the Executive,” the AUMF fails to satisfy the clarity and 
responsibilities). 
 95. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2655. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (citing Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 (1944) (“We must assume, when asked to 
find implied powers in a grant of legislative or executive authority, that the law makers intended to 
place no greater restraint on the citizen than was clearly and unmistakably indicated by the language 
they used.”)). 
 98. See id. 
 99. Brief for Respondents at 21, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696). 
 100. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2656. 
 101. Id. at 2657. 
 102. Id. at 2654 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92–116, at 2, 4–5 (1971)). 
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explicitness requirements of the Non-Detention Act.103 Unless Congress 
clearly authorized detention or imprisonment, the executive has no power 
to detain citizens on American territory.104
 
E.  Justice Scalia’s Dissent 
 
Justice Scalia looked at the historical development of habeas corpus 
in the context of citizen enemy combatants for his reasoning. From this 
he concluded that the executive has two alternatives to avoid a court 
order to release Hamdi upon a habeas petition: prosecution or suspension 
of the writ of habeas corpus.105 For Justice Scalia, the distinction between 
enemy aliens and citizens who aid the enemy is important because “our 
constitutional tradition” is to detain the former for the duration of 
hostilities, but to charge the latter with treason or some other offense and 
try them criminally.106 Where national crises, such as rebellion or war, 
make normal criminal process for suspected traitors impracticable, the 
Congress is empowered to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.107 
Therefore, if the executive wishes to avoid the burdens imposed by due 
process it can only do so only by urging Congress to employ the 
Suspension Clause.108
Justice Scalia confronted the plurality position by claiming that, 
although the Constitution does not explicitly require a choice between 
these alternatives, tradition and precedent preclude any other options.109 
Justice Scalia’s examination of the English and early American histories 
of habeas corpus, culminated in his reliance upon Ex parte Milligan.110 
The conclusion he took from Milligan and the habeas history is that 
“criminal process was viewed as the primary means—and the only 
 103. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2654. Notably, Justices Scalia and Kennedy agree that the AUMF is 
not clear enough “to satisfy the interpretive canon that statutes should be construed so as to avoid 
grave constitutional concerns; or with the clarity necessary to overcome the statutory prescription 
that ‘[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to 
an Act of Congress.’ 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a).” Id. at 2671 (citations omitted). 
 104. Id. at 2660 (“[T]he Government has failed to justify holding [Hamdi] in the absence of a 
further Act of Congress, criminal charges, a showing that the detention conforms to the laws of war, 
or a demonstration that [the Non-Detention Act] is unconstitutional. I would therefore vacate the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for proceedings consistent with this view.”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. This is exactly what the executive did with John Walker Lindh. See Lindh, supra note 
29 and accompanying text. 
 107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 108. Although President Lincoln asserted an executive right to suspend habeas corpus during 
the Civil War, that interpretation of the Constitution was rejected in Ex parte Merryman. See supra 
note 15. 
 109. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2666. 
 110. 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866). 
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means absent congressional action suspending the writ—not only to 
punish traitors, but to incapacitate them,” and that this “is consistent with 
the Founders’ general mistrust of military power permanently at the 
Executive’s disposal.”111 The plurality’s reliance upon the government’s 
interest in national security to abridge due process, therefore, is at odds 
with that wariness.112
The plurality relied heavily upon Quirin to avoid the rule in Milligan 
and to justify the government’s holding of a U.S. citizen as a military 
prisoner instead of as a criminal or traitor. Justice Scalia dismissed 
Quirin as poorly decided and of weak value as precedent.113 Furthermore, 
the plurality read Quirin incorrectly. According to Justice Scalia it is 
properly distinguished from Hamdi’s petition because the defendants in 
Quirin conceded that they were enemy invaders, and thus their status as 
enemy combatants was undisputed.114 Therefore, Haupt’s (the citizen 
enemy combatant in Quirin) detention by the executive under the rules of 
war (i.e. without criminal trial and normal due process) was lawful. 
Hamdi, on the other hand, vigorously contested his classification as a 
belligerent. Therefore, Justice Scalia concluded, “where those 
jurisdictional facts are not conceded—where the petitioner insists that he 
is not a belligerent—Quirin left the pre-existing law in place: Absent 
suspension of the writ, a citizen held where the courts are open is entitled 
either to criminal trial or to a judicial decree requiring his release.”115 
Since it is not the Court’s function “to make illegal detention legal by 
supplying a process that the Government could have provided, but chose 
not to,” the Court should have granted Hamdi’s habeas petition instead of 
remanding with instructions for “basic process.”116
Justice Scalia would hold that in the absence of suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus, criminal proceedings must be brought promptly or 
 111. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2668. 
 112. Id. at 2669. 
 113. Id. (“The case was not this Court’s finest hour.”); see also Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. 
Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1296 
(2002) (calling Quirin “an old and troubling court decision” and cautioning against its revitalization 
as a tool to justify the use of military tribunals against American citizens deemed “unlawful 
belligerents”). Historical research on Quirin has revealed that “a principal reason for authorization of 
these military tribunals [to be held in secrecy] was the government’s wish to cover up the evidence 
of the FBI’s bungling of the case.” Id. at 1291 (citing David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs’ Case, 1 J. 
SUP. CT. HIST. 61 (1996)). Additionally, Quirin is associated temporally and contextually with 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which upheld the executive’s detention of citizens 
with Japanese ancestry during World War II. The plurality’s poor choice of precedent in Quirin is a 
subject that could occupy another paper of itself and is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 114. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2670. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 2673. 
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the detainee must be released.117 The plurality reached beyond the limits 
of judicial power by qualifying and limiting the process due to an 
American citizen in special circumstances such as the War Against 
Terrorism.118 Justice Scalia argued that those limitations are better and 
more properly defined by the people’s representatives than by the 
Supreme Court’s use of a balancing test of its own devising.119
 
F.  Justice Thomas’s Dissent 
 
Justice Thomas accepted the government’s arguments in their 
entirety. His conclusion was based on his view of separation of powers 
doctrine. Citing such classic cases as Curtiss-Wright, Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube, and Dames & Moore, 120 he interpreted a broad sweep of 
executive authority over citizens taken in battle as a necessary adjunct to 
the president’s national security responsibility.121 Justice Thomas 
concluded that the AUMF implicitly gave the executive plenary authority 
over any combatant captured, whether or not a U.S. citizen, by 
authorizing military action.122 Once the political branches have 
determined that the United States is at war and the executive’s security 
powers have been authorized, the executive is supported “by the 
strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial 
interpretation.”123 Therefore, although the judiciary may examine the 
legality of Hamdi’s detention, it cannot interfere with the executive’s 
“political” determination that Hamdi is an enemy combatant.124
Consequently, Justice Thomas accepts the Mobbs Declaration as 
sufficient factual basis for Hamdi’s detention.125 Calling upon the 
 117. Id. at 2671. 
 118. Justice Scalia called this a “Mr. Fix-it Mentality.” “The plurality seems to view it as its 
mission to Make Everything Come Out Right, rather than merely to decree the consequences . . . of 
the other two branches’ actions and omissions.” Id. at 2673. 
 119. Id. at 2672 (“[The Court] claims authority to engage in this sort of ‘judicious balancing’ 
from Mathews v. Eldridge, a case involving . . . the withdrawal of disability benefits! Whatever the 
merits of this technique when newly recognized property rights are at issue (and even there they are 
questionable), it has no place where the Constitution and the common law already supply an 
answer.” (citations omitted)). 
 120. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 121. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2675-77. 
 122. Id. at 2679. He also alluded to the opinion that the no such authorization is ever needed: 
“Although the President very well may have inherent authority to detain those arrayed against our 
troops . . . we need not decide that question . . . .” Id. 
 123. Id. at 2679-80 (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981)). 
 124. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2678. 
 125. “[I] do not think the plurality has adequately explained the breadth of the President’s 
authority . . . an authority that includes making virtually conclusive factual findings. . . . In this 
context, due process requires nothing more than a good-faith executive determination.” Id. at 2680. 
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Youngstown precedent, Justice Thomas pointed to the reasons why the 
courts should not second-guess determinations of this nature made by the 
executive. First, in matters of national security and foreign diplomacy 
“the courts simply lack the relevant information and expertise . . . .”126 
Second, even if the judiciary possessed all of the relevant information, its 
decisions on these matters “are simply not amenable to judicial 
determination because ‘[t]hey are delicate, complex, and involve large 
elements of prophecy.’”127 Third, the Court has interpreted the 
Constitution to assign foreign and military affairs exclusively to the 
political branches.128 Of Justice Jackson’s three categories in his 
Youngstown concurrence, Justice Thomas puts Hamdi’s detention into 
the first category—the president’s authority is at its apogee when his 
actions arguably fall within the purview of his Article II powers and he 
has received congressional authorization.129 Accordingly, Justice Thomas 
would have affirmed the Fourth Circuit ruling dismissing Hamdi’s 
petition.130
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
Security crises often come into direct conflict with civil liberties. The 
record of the United States in dealing with such conflicts is mixed. It is 
admirable that civil liberties have been protected and even expanded in 
spite of the many security crises through which the nation has passed. On 
the other hand, times of threat and fear have frequently led Americans to 
accept government intrusions on their liberties.131 In hindsight, the 
general sentiment of the American people became one of regret for each 
of these incidents and to regard them as unnecessarily drastic.132 Our 
responsibility, of course, is to learn from history and to institute policies 
 126. Id. at 2676; accord Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 
(1948). 
 127. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2676 (quoting Chicago & Southern, 333 U.S. at 111). 
 128. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2676; accord Chicago & Southern, 333 U.S. at 103. 
 129. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2677. 
 130. Id. at 2685. 
 131. See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 103-05 for an overview of intrusions on civil liberties 
during national emergencies. These include the following: the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 used 
to imprison newspaper editors who were too vocal in their criticism of President Adams’ foreign 
policy; President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War used to imprison 
newspaper editors who opposed his policies on the Southern rebellion; the Espionage Act of 1917 
used to silence protests against U.S. involvement in World War I; the internment of citizens with 
Japanese ancestry during World War II; and the Supreme Court’s questionable deference to the 
government in its prosecution of a Vietnam protester who burned his draft card. 
 132. E.g., id. at 105-06 (“[I]t now seems clear that the Supreme Court’s decisions in World 
War I and World War II were plainly wrong . . . The fact that these decisions were written by some 
of the Supreme Court’s staunchest defenders of civil liberties . . . only highlights the difficulty of 
preserving civil liberties in the midst of war.”). 
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and procedures that prevent the recurrence of such events. 
 
A.  Separation of Powers Issues 
 
The government’s brief and Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion 
purport to require complete deference to the executive’s detention of 
Hamdi for the sake of preserving the federal government’s separated 
powers. In reality, this position conflates the legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers into the singular hands of the executive. The executive 
alone created the criteria it used to classify Hamdi as an enemy 
combatant, and determined the length and condition of his detention. The 
executive alone retained custody of Hamdi. And the executive claimed 
that it alone could have adjudicated the matter by, first, denying judicial 
review completely133 and, second, asserting that habeas review was 
limited only to the question whether detention per se was authorized.134 
Criticizing the president’s assertion of his prerogative to merge these 
powers,135 Neal Katyal and Laurence Tribe observed: 
 
A time of terror may not be the ideal moment to trifle with the most 
time-tested postulates of government under law. It is certainly not a 
good time to dispense lightly with bedrock principles of our 
constitutional system. Central among those principles is that great 
power must be held in check and that the body that defines what 
conduct to outlaw, the body that prosecutes violators, and the body that 
adjudicates guilt and dispenses punishment should be three distinct 
entities. To fuse those three functions under one man’s ultimate rule, 
and to administer the resulting simulacrum of justice in a system of 
tribunals created by that very same authority, is to mock the very notion 
of constitutionalism and to make light of any aspiration to live by the 
rule of law.136
 
The Hamdi Court did much to preserve the separation of judicial and 
executive powers by insisting on more than mere nominal review of the 
executive’s authorization to detain. By guaranteeing that habeas 
petitioners will be afforded judicial review of their classification as an 
enemy combatants the Court partially honored its central function as the 
branch of government empowered to determine guilt and punishment. 
Unfortunately, the Court’s effort to compromise between Hamdi’s and 
 133. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 135. See Exec. Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 136. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 113, at 1259. 
   
437] CITIZEN ENEMY COMBATANTS 457 
 
the government’s competing interests confuses the separation of powers 
of the three branches. By limiting the process afforded citizens who are 
accused of being enemy combatants, the plurality’s decision surrendered 
to the executive many of the safeguards that the judiciary should use to 
protect the public against the arbitrary exercise of power. Furthermore, 
the Hamdi decision itself is an incursion by the judiciary into the 
legislative domain in its selection of which due process elements should 
and should not be retained in citizen enemy combatant petitions. Finally, 
the Hamdi decision completely neglected the Article I incursions of the 
Bush administration’s detention policy by legitimizing the executive’s 
exercise of the legislative power to create the right to detain someone, 
and its establishment of inferior tribunals. 
 
1.  Executive incursions into the judiciary 
 
Due process is often considered to be a collection of protections of 
individual liberties and indeed it is as much. But it is also a structural 
protection that is meant to prevent excessive blurring of the lines 
between the executive and judicial powers.137 This is achieved by 
preventing the executive from becoming the “judge in his own case”138 
that would combine executive and judicial functions making both 
arbitrary and open to abuse. Thus, the protections of due process function 
not only as a safeguard for individuals, but also as “guideposts for the 
exercise of executive authority[,] . . . at once [protecting] individual 
[liberty] and standard[s] of executive conduct.”139
By surrendering certain procedural protections because they are 
inconvenient to the executive’s prosecution of the War Against 
Terrorism, the Hamdi decision blurs the line between executive and 
judicial powers that are meant to be maintained as distinct. By making 
hearsay admissible, and then presuming its truth,140 the Court removed at 
least two of the guideposts that define the proper limits of executive 
conduct. The presumption in favor of the government’s case shifts the 
burden of proof to the habeas petitioner, eviscerating the fundamental 
premise of the writ of habeas corpus: that he who detains is charged with 
proving the legality of the detention. Under the plurality’s “basic 
 137. See generally J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1687 (2004); see also Thomas J. Lepri, Note, Safeguarding the Enemy Within: The Need for 
Procedural Protections for U.S. Citizens Detained as Enemy Combatants Under Ex Parte Quirin, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2565 (2003). 
 138. Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610); see generally JOHN V. ORTH, DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY, ch. 2 (2003). 
 139. Wilkinson, supra note 137, at 1697. 
 140. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2649 (2004). 
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process” the petitioner must prove the legality of his liberty. In these 
ways the Hamdi decision allows the executive power to detain to reach 
beyond its boundaries into the realm of the judiciary’s power to curb 
arbitrary detention. In times of crisis, when the executive has its greatest 
incentive to expand its powers, and Congress and the public it represents 
have corresponding incentives to capitulate, the judiciary must be at its 
strongest and clearest. 
 
2.  Judicial incursions into the legislature 
 
Hamdi caused the Supreme Court also to become guilty of acting 
beyond its prescribed limits. The plurality held that certain “core 
elements” of due process must be afforded the enemy combatant habeas 
petitioner.141 As noted above, it explicitly excluded other procedural 
protections and left room for the exclusion of still more.142 Indeed, it 
seems as though anything not enumerated as part of “basic process” can, 
and arguably will be, excluded in future litigation concerning War 
Against Terrorism detentions. The question arises as to how the Court 
settled on its list of protections that were to be included in “basic 
process.” Certain protections that once seemed fundamental—
presumption of innocence of the detainee, burden of proof on the police 
power, the right to remain silent, the right against self-incrimination—are 
now not deemed to be “core elements” or “essential promises” of the 
Constitution, at least in regard to citizens that the executive, on its own, 
classifies as enemy combatants. Without an answer to the first question, 
a more important structural question arises: is it not the function of the 
legislature, the elected representatives of the people, to decide which 
liberties and procedural protections the people will surrender? 
The separation of federal powers is a structural safeguard to liberty 
in two ways; it protects the minority from the potential for tyranny in 
majority rule, and it protects individual liberties against arbitrary power 
by diffusing power among competing branches.143 Under this scheme, 
any national abridgment of civil liberties must be accomplished by all 
three branches of the federal government.144 Thus, 
 
[d]espite the more sweeping grant of power to the President in the 
opening Vesting Clause of Article II, [the enumerated legislative 
powers of Article I] create a framework that requires legislative 
 141. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
 143. Wilkinson, supra note 137, at 1688. 
 144. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 113, at 1268. 
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approval for all significant deprivations of liberty. This framework is 
itself fractal of a larger order, for the Constitution’s entire structure 
creates a ‘rights-protecting asymmetry’ whereby the concurrence of all 
three branches is necessary before the government may decisively alter 
anyone’s legal rights or entitlements: In a word, these rights may not be 
curtailed except pursuant to duly enacted law.145
 
This concern was the crux of Justices Souter’s and Ginsburg’s argument 
in their concurring opinion: That the legislature had deliberately erected 
a barrier to the executive and judicial branches’ power to deprive a 
citizen of physical liberty without the participation and approval of 
Congress through the Non-Detention Act.146 Indeed, the purpose of the 
act was to prevent another Korematsu decision, in which the Supreme 
Court legitimized racially motivated executive wartime detentions that 
were conducted without express congressional authorization.147 The 
concurrence concluded that the AUMF was insufficient congressional 
approval of Hamdi’s detention and, therefore, that the Court should not 
sustain it.148
Justices Scalia and Stevens also took issue with the lack of 
congressional participation in Hamdi’s detention. They, like Justices 
Souter and Ginsburg, found insufficient congressional authorization to 
detain.149 They also focused on the tradition of habeas corpus doctrine, 
drawing upon the Suspension Clause and precedent for the premise that 
Congress alone can suspend the writ.150 The Hamdi decision was, in 
effect, a partial suspension of the writ (by limiting the procedural 
protections the writ invokes) in the absence of any congressional action 
to suspend. Even if one accepts the plurality’s conclusion that the AUMF 
was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Non-Detention Act, i.e. 
that the executive was authorized to detain Hamdi, it says nothing of the 
deprivation of procedural protections like the rule of evidence against 
hearsay or the presumption of innocence in favor of the detainee. 
Although incomplete, this was nonetheless a judicial incursion into the 
legislative prerogative that dishonors the structural system of the 
 145. Id. (emphasis added). 
 146. See supra Part II.D. 
 147. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. “Although an Act of Congress ratified and 
confirmed an Executive order authorizing the military to exclude individuals from defined areas and 
to accommodate those it might remove, the statute said nothing whatever about the detention of 
those who might be removed; internment camps were creatures of the Executive, and confinement in 
them rested on assertion of Executive authority.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2654 (2004) 
(citations omitted) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 148. See supra note 104. 
 149. See supra note 103. 
 150. See supra Part II.E. 
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Constitution, and, in Justice Scalia’s opinion, unduly enlarges the power 
of the Court at the expense of Congress’s authority.151 In essence, the 
Hamdi plurality decided that the executive could not legislate 
abridgments to due process, but the Supreme Court could. Although the 
Court recognized that “commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection,”152 
it failed to see that it also requires the protection of legislative approval. 
By ratifying in part and “fixing” (as Justice Scalia put it) in part the 
executive’s action against Hamdi, the plurality participated with the 
executive in the usurpation of Congress’s power to define the curtailment 
of the public’s liberties. Removing this power (and, more importantly, 
this responsibility) from the representatives of the people seriously 
undermines those structural protections that Madison and others saw as 
the fundamental barrier to tyranny.153 This remains true even if 
Congress’s members prefer to insulate themselves from potentially 
unpopular decisions by allowing the president or the Supreme Court to 
abridge civil liberties. The Court should have put the ball back into 
Congress’s court by holding that, unless it legislated and empowered the 
president to prosecute and detain Hamdi legally, it would order his 
release. Only representatives directly accountable to their constituencies 
and endowed by the Constitution with legislative power should take 
action regarding the quantity and quality of liberty that American citizens 
enjoy. 
 
3.  Executive incursions into the legislature 
 
The Hamdi decision ratified two improper legislative actions taken 
 151. Scalia, in his dissent, stated: 
It should not be thought, however, that the plurality’s evisceration of the Suspension 
Clause augments, principally, the power of Congress. As usual, the major effect of its 
constitutional improvisation is to increase the power of the Court. Having found a 
congressional authorization for detention of citizens where none clearly exists; and 
having discarded the categorical procedural protection of the Suspension Clause; the 
plurality then proceeds . . . to prescribe what procedural protections it thinks appropriate. 
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2672 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 152. Id. at 2646-47 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)). 
 153. J. Harvie Wilkinson III stated: 
[For Jefferson] . . . ‘the solution was clear: a bill of rights, which he advocated from the 
moment he first saw the Constitution. . . . But Madison—who in the end would write the 
national Bill of Rights—pointed out to Jefferson that a limited enumeration of human 
rights would never prevent anyone from misusing power. Only structural balances within 
a government, Madison thought, pitting one force against another, could keep the misuse 
of power in check and so protect minority rights. 
Wilkinson, supra note 137, at 1688 (quoting BERNARD BAILYN, TO BEGIN THE WORLD ANEW: THE 
GENIUS AND AMBIGUITY OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS 48 (2003)); see also, e.g., THE FEDERALIST 
NOS. 10, 47 (James Madison). 
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by the executive with respect to enemy combatant detentions: the 
president’s creation of military commissions and his expansion of the 
enemy combatant category. 
Two months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
President Bush issued a Military Order through which he created military 
commissions to try suspected terrorists and al-Qaeda collaborators.154 
Yet the creation of “tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court” is an 
enumerated power of Congress.155 A review of precedents on inferior 
tribunals led Professor Pfander to conclude: 
 
The inferior tribunals account suggests reasons to proceed cautiously in 
the consideration of the legality of military tribunals or commissions 
for the trial of illegal enemy combatants, especially any who claim U.S. 
citizenship or commit alleged crimes on U.S. soil. The account holds 
that the President lacks power to fashion his own set of tribunals, free 
from legislative control. Instead, the Constitution empowers Congress 
to create inferior tribunals, including all courts that act as such outside 
the parameters of Article III.156
 
In Milligan, the Court held that, even when Congress properly creates 
military tribunals, they cannot be used to try citizens when civil courts 
are open and unobstructed.157 Although the plurality reads Quirin to 
modify that holding to allow military trials of citizen enemy combatants, 
Katyal and Tribe assert that the general principle that “congressional 
authorization [is] at least a necessary requirement for such tribunals” has 
“never [been] repudiated in subsequent cases.”158 This principle “leaves 
the president little unilateral freedom to craft an order to detain people on 
his own suspicion for indefinite warehousing or trial at his pleasure in a 
system of military justice.”159 And yet, that is exactly what the Military 
Order has done: it has authorized the Secretary of Defense to detain 
individuals classified as enemy combatants and to appoint military 
commissions to try them.160
 154. Exec. Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001). 
 155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To constitute Tribunals 
inferior to the supreme Court. . . .”). 
 156. James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the 
United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 757 (2004) (emphasis added). 
 157. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text. 
 158. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 113, at 1279-80. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Exec. Order, supra note 154, at § 3 (“Any individual subject to this order shall be - (a) 
detained at an appropriate location designated by the Secretary of Defense outside or within the 
United States . . . .”); id at § 4(b) (“[T]he Secretary of Defense . . . shall issue such orders and 
regulations, including orders for the appointment of one or more military commissions, as may be 
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The plurality opinion lacks a clear rejection of the executive’s claim 
of authority to appoint military commissions with jurisdiction over 
enemy combatants of the War Against Terrorism without congressional 
input.161 Instead, the opinion vaguely implies that military tribunals 
“appropriately authorized and properly constituted” could meet the 
standards of “basic process” without making clear that such authorization 
and constitution must come from Congress.162 The Court should have 
clearly repudiated the executive’s use of this legislative power, especially 
when it is employed against American citizens. While it asserted the 
Court’s right to oversee habeas petitions, it should have invalidated the 
use of these commissions and sent the issue back to the president. The 
president then could have made his recommendation to Congress for 
authorization of the tribunals, specifications as to who could be tried by 
them, and so forth. This would have allowed all three branches to pass 
off on the detention scheme and reduce the risk of abuse. 
The Hamdi decision also improperly validated the executive’s 
exercise of legislative powers in defining the extent of its authority to 
detain. This Note has already discussed the concerns of four of the 
justices that Congress had not clearly authorized Hamdi’s detention.163 If 
this is the case, then the executive acted as a legislature in expanding the 
authorization to cover Hamdi. Even if the AUMF is sufficient 
authorization for detention, Hamdi’s classification as an enemy 
combatant probably rests upon criteria originating from the executive. 
Congress defined the offenses that qualified someone for trial by military 
commission, and to this the Department of Defense added twenty 
more.164 This action has been called “spectacular usurpation of the 
legislative function,” and indeed, it flows naturally out of the executive’s 
argument that authorization to use the military against those responsible 
for the September 11 attacks is actually a blank check of power over 
anyone it labels an “enemy combatant.”165 The government and Justice 
necessary to carry out [trials of enemy combatants].”). 
 161. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2651 (2004) (“There remains the possibility that the 
standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted 
military tribunal.”). 
 162. Cf. Neal K. Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantánamo Cases, 2004 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 49, 66-67 (2004) (“[The Rasul and Hamdi decisions] should force a tremendous 
rethinking of the way the commissions will operate. In my view, the entire process for the 
commissions is flawed from start to finish, from their procedure to their substance to their 
adjudication.”). 
 163. See supra Part II.D; notes 147-51 and accompanying text. The four justices are Souter, 
Ginsburg, Scalia, and Stevens. 
 164. Katyal, supra note 162, at 67; see also General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, 
Military Commission Instruction No. 2, Crimes and Elements for Trial by Military Commission 
(April 30, 2003), at  http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/mci2.pdf. 
 165. Katyal, supra note 162, at 67 (“This spectacular usurpation of the legislative function is 
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Thomas argued that congressional participation is not necessary because 
these detention powers were inherent to the president’s Article II 
Commander-in-Chief powers.166 However, a recent survey of the history 
of the federal detention power revealed that there never was such 
authority inherent in the executive branch; it has always resided with the 
legislature despite the contrary assertions and efforts of many 
presidents.167 Justice Souter’s structural argument against implying 
authorization to detain in order to satisfy the Non-Detention Act is as 
applicable here. He wrote: 
 
The defining character of American constitutional government is its 
constant tension between security and liberty, serving both by partial 
helpings of each. In a government of separated powers, deciding finally 
on what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace 
or war (or some condition in between) is not well entrusted to the 
Executive Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to 
maintain security. For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch 
of the Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on 
which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance 
between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to 
victory. . . .”168
 
Permitting the executive to create an added list of offenses by which it 
will classify aliens,169 American citizens captured abroad,170 and 
American citizens apprehended domestically171 as “enemy combatants” 
and thereby deny them due process is to allow exactly the arbitrary 
exercise of power to which American citizens applaud themselves as 
being immune. This capricious use of power is most easily illustrated by 
the differing fates of Yaser Hamdi and John Walker Lindh. Lindh, the 
executive decreed, was not an enemy combatant (even though he was 
found armed and in the company of enemy troops), and so was provided 
a lawyer and access to family, prosecuted criminally, and afforded the 
full array of due process and constitutional protections.172 Hamdi, on the 
bound to have predictable consequences: offenses are consistently defined in ways that benefit the 
prosecution. Indeed, the offenses are all defined after the fact, raising the concern that the offenses 
are defined to fit particular offenders, rather than being demarcated in a sober and evenhanded 
way.”). 
 166. See supra Part II.B.3 and Part II.F. 
 167. Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, The Detention Power, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (2004). 
 168. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2655 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 169. E.g., Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
 170. E.g., Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633. 
 171. E.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). 
 172. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
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other hand, was classified as an enemy combatant, and so was denied 
access to anyone but military interrogators and held in military custody 
for nearly three years. The executive has refused to disclose the factual 
differences (if there are any) that dictated the disparate fates of Lindh and 
Hamdi, and it has argued that no other branch of government should 
have any oversight of these determinations. This is not the regularity, 
transparency, and equality of rule of law; this is rule by executive fiat. 
The Hamdi decision partially ameliorated that condition by 
reasserting the principle of judicial review of a habeas petitioner’s 
detention. The Court did not go far enough, however, because it left the 
executive’s legislation untouched. Even worse, the Court indirectly 
validated the criteria created by the executive by affording a different, 
lower standard of review to citizens classified as enemy combatants by 
the executive. In other words, the Court allowed the executive to apply 
rules of its own devising – a dangerous conflation of legislative and 
executive powers. The Court thus protected its own jurisdiction over 
habeas petitioners, but did not protect Congress’s domain over the 
creation of crimes and authorization to detain. 
Instead, the Court should have remanded with an order to the lower 
courts to scrutinize the criteria the government used to classify Hamdi as 
a combatant, and to weed out any criterion not created by Congress. If 
the executive determined that the criteria it created were essential to 
success in the War Against Terrorism, again, the president could 
recommend their adoption to Congress. 
This failure of the Court to observe strictly the separation of powers 
is unacceptable given that “[a]t stake . . . is nothing less than the essence 
of a free society. Even more important than the method of selecting the 
people’s rulers and their successors is the character of the constraints 
imposed on the Executive by the rule of law.”173 This constraint is one of 
the few assertions of the Magna Carta whose applicability has endured 
the centuries because of its essential nature to limited government.174 
Moreover, the principal method of constraint created by the Founders is 
the separation of powers. Thus, 
 
the Constitution sets up a structure whereby the concurrence of all three 
branches is normally needed in order to authorize a decisive departure 
from the legal status quo. Certainly, when a President is to take action 
 173. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2735 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 174. MAGNA CARTA ¶¶ 39 & 40 (“No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of 
his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor 
will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgement [sic] 
of his equal or by the law of the land. To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or 
justice.”). 
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that puts basic constitutional guarantees at risk, legislative authorization 
is presumptively required. Nothing in the Constitution, including the 
Commander-in-Chief Clause, alters this basic constitutional 
arrangement.175
 
B.  Inadequate Preservation of Habeas Corpus Protections 
 
A principal purpose of the separation of powers is to ensure the 
preservation of American civil liberties through the end of a security 
crisis. The writ of habeas corpus is an essential tool of this system. It is 
the vehicle through which the unlawfully detained may invoke due 
process protections by requiring their captor to justify the detention. The 
Hamdi decision’s sacrifice of many, if not most, due process protections 
eviscerates the effectiveness of habeas corpus and weakens the barrier 
that centuries of experience erected between the individual and the 
state’s executive power. The “basic process” standard articulated by the 
plurality is unclear and may prove ineffective. What constitutes a “fair 
opportunity to rebut” the government’s evidence? How secure, for 
example, is Hamdi’s right to access counsel?176 What is the evidentiary 
tipping point at which the burden of proof shifts from the government to 
the detainee?177 What if the detainee alleges that the government’s 
evidence was obtained through torture and is therefore unreliable or 
unfairly self-incriminating?178 According to Hamdi lower courts may use 
 175. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 113, at 1266. 
 176. The plurality’s statement on the matter seems to be dictum and is qualified as applying to 
the proceedings on remand: 
Hamdi asks us to hold that the Fourth Circuit also erred by denying him immediate 
access to counsel upon his detention and by disposing of the case without permitting him 
to meet with an attorney. Since our grant of certiorari in this case, Hamdi has been 
appointed counsel, with whom he has met for consultation purposes on several occasions, 
and with whom he is now being granted unmonitored meetings. He unquestionably has 
the right to access to counsel in connection with the proceedings on remand. No further 
consideration of this issue is necessary at this stage of the case. 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2652 (2004) (citation omitted). The government contends that 
Hamdi’s access to counsel is a matter for executive discretion and did not concede that he was 
entitled to such. Brief for Respondents at 39-42, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 
03-6696). The possibility remains, therefore, that a court could accept the government’s argument 
that access to counsel would jeopardize national security or interfere with military operations or 
interrogation and deny the right since it is not enumerated as a “core element” of due process in the 
plurality’s opinion. 
 177. If hearsay is allowed, is the Mobbs Declaration sufficient, as the Fourth Circuit found, or 
is something more substantial required of the government? 
 178. As time goes on, this seems to be less a remote possibility than a probability. See, e.g., 
Charles H. Brower II, The Lives of Animals, the Lives of Prisoners, and the Revelations of Abu 
Ghraib, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1353, 1379-80 (2004) (reviewing the prisoner abuse scandals 
of the War Against Terrorism and concluding that “the facts reveal an ever-expanding population of 
detainees intentionally placed ever farther beyond the protection of the law.”); Maj. Gen. Antonio M. 
Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, at 
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their discretion in deciding how those questions are to be answered. The 
government might easily exploit this vagueness. For example, if the case 
against a terror suspect is weak, the government could classify him as an 
enemy combatant and use Hamdi to remove most of the due process 
constraints.179 Whether one is inclined to suspect the government of such 
duplicity, or whether one implicitly trusts government action, where civil 
liberties are concerned the most sensible approach is the healthy 
skepticism and wariness exemplified by this nation’s revolutionary and 
founding generations.180
The weakening of due process standards runs the risk of turning the 
habeas review into a rubber-stamping of executive detention, a judicial 
imprimatur legitimizing detentions that do not conform to constitutional 
and common law standards.181 A court sympathetic to the executive’s 
national security dilemma, like the Fourth Circuit, or ideologically prone 
to give wide latitudes of deference to the executive, like Justice Thomas, 
will not be inclined to afford detainees much more than the bare 
minimum that is required by the relaxed standards of “basic process.”182 
http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf (the military’s investigation report of the Abu 
Ghraib prison scandal revealing widespread torture and failures in the chain of command to stop it); 
Alberto F. Gonzales, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Counsel to the President 
Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340A 1 (August 1, 2002), at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf 
(counsel to the president concluding that “certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading” but will 
only constitute torture if the physical pain caused is “equivalent in intensity to the pain 
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even 
death. For purely mental pain or suffering . . . it must result in significant psychological harm of 
significant duration, e.g. lasting for months or even years.”). 
 179. This problem with the Hamdi decision is compounded by the Executive’s usurpation of 
legislative powers in creating offenses that will define a detainee as an enemy combatant. See supra 
Part III.A.3. 
 180. E.g., JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS 
ASSESSMENTS, ¶ 3 (1785) Here, Madison stated: 
Because it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We hold this 
prudent jealousy to be the first duty of Citizens, and one of the noblest characteristics of 
the late Revolution. The free men of America did not wait till usurped power had 
strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the 
consequences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the 
principle. We revere this lesson too much soon to forget it. 
Id; see generally, GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-87, ch. 1 
(1998). 
 181. Katyal and Tribe forecast that “without suitably sculpted legislation the prospect of 
habeas review could require the disclosure of intelligence information in such proceedings—a 
prospect that could lead courts to water habeas review down to nothing more than a hollow 
formality.” Katyal & Tribe, supra note 113, at 1308. This potential is exacerbated by the fact that 
“basic process” has already hurried this process along by watering down the procedural protections 
that habeas corpus invokes. 
 182. The bare minimum required by “basic process” is not much: “notice of the factual basis 
for [a detainee’s] classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions 
before a neutral decisionmaker.” Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648-49. 
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It is conceivable that a court not interested in questioning the executive 
may give the detainee “notice of the factual basis for his classification as 
an enemy combatant,”183 grant a hearing, accept whatever reasonable 
evidence the government presents, and send the detainee right back to 
indefinite detention. The plurality’s “basic process” standard is too 
relaxed to require a court more sympathetic to the government’s interests 
than to the detainee’s to conduct a truly meaningful review, one that 
would insure that detention is justified. 
These concerns should not be considered “ideological or unduly 
melodramatic.”184 As the plurality itself held, we should consider the 
ramifications of this doctrine on “the erroneously detained individual.”185 
Consider the plight of Brandon Mayfield, a Muslim convert and law-
abiding attorney from Oregon. He was held on a material witness 
warrant, like José Padilla, after the FBI fingerprint unit mistakenly 
matched his fingerprint to the train bombings in Madrid, Spain in March 
2004.186 Subsequent investigation revealed that sloppy laboratory 
practices and the defensiveness of a lead FBI fingerprint expert were the 
principal causes of the mistake that led to Mayfield’s incarceration.187 
One wonders what consequences would follow if Mr. Mayfield had been 
re-classified as an enemy combatant and transferred incommunicado to a 
naval brig as was Mr. Padilla. According to Hamdi, he would suddenly 
find that certain “non-essential” constitutional protections such as the 
presumption of innocence, did not apply to him. With a presumption in 
favor of the government’s evidence, limited or no access to counsel, and 
other due process protections suspended by the executive’s unilateral 
designation of him as an enemy combatant, Mayfield would have a 
difficult time rebutting the evidence that resulted from error within the 
executive. In fact, his exoneration would rely entirely on the will of the 
executive to expose its own error.188 The odds would be stacked against 
 183. Id. 
 184. Vladeck, supra note 167, at 195. 
 185. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2647. 
 186. See, e.g., Blaine Harden, FBI Faulted in Arrest of Ore. Lawyer; Study by Forensic 
Experts Cites Mistakes in Fingerprint Identification, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2004, at A2. 
 187. See, e.g., Flynn McRoberts & Maurice Possley, Report Blasts FBI Lab; Peer Pressure 
Led to False ID of Madrid Fingerprint, CHIC. TRIB., Nov. 14, 2004, at C1 (“Once the mind-set 
occurred with the initial examiner, the subsequent examinations were tainted,’ Robert Stacey, chief 
of the FBI laboratory’s quality assurance and training unit, wrote in a report outlining the findings of 
the international review committee. ‘To disagree was not an expected response.’”). 
 188. The decision to shroud the Quirin case in secrecy was due to the Roosevelt 
administration’s desire to hide FBI operational errors in apprehending the defendants; evidence of 
serious FBI mistakes would have undermined the president’s desire to use the case for propaganda 
purposes. Danelski, supra note 113, at 66-67. Given the political pressures to succeed placed on a 
president who oversaw the most devastating foreign attack on American soil on September 11, 2001, 
it should not be too far-fetched to imagine the Bush administration (or any administration) hiding 
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Mayfield in such a way that an unjustified and mistaken detention of an 
American citizen could be perpetuated, based upon the will of the 
executive, because the constitutional safeguards meant to prevent it are 
not “essential promises” of the Constitution or “core elements” of due 
process.189
To guard against that possibility, what is required is an exacting 
habeas review according to its tradition, not a weaker one. As James 
Pfander observed, apart from the separation of powers questions raised 
by allowing the executive to establish tribunals, 
 
the designation of an individual as an enemy combatant presents the 
classic issue of jurisdictional boundaries on which constitutional rights 
of the first magnitude depend. Citizens . . . enjoy familiar rights to 
counsel, bail, freedom from self-incrimination, and a speedy trial 
before a jury of their peers—rights that an enemy combatant 
designation avowedly sacrifices in favor of indefinite detention and 
interrogation. With so much depending on the designation’s factual 
accuracy, the inferior tribunals account suggests the need for relatively 
searching review of the government’s enemy combatant designation.190
 
Not only does Hamdi permit military tribunals to control the level of a 
citizen detainee’s access to habeas rights through its unilateral enemy 
combatant classification, but when the judiciary reviews the evidence 
justifying detention it is already skewed in the government’s favor. In 
other words, the judiciary co-adjudicates with the executive; the 
executive judges in its classification of the detainee, and the courts finish 
with a cursory examination of the executive’s determination. It should be 
the other way around: courts should approach the detainee as a free 
person until the executive has shown otherwise. 
 
C.  Lack of Predictability and Uniformity 
 
Finally, the need for a bright-line rule also derives from core ideals 
sought after in the law: uniformity and predictability. The Hamdi 
decision creates no predictability for detainees, nor uniformity for 
government actors. Already the executive has treated two detainees from 
mistakes and exaggerating success in order to present the impression of strength in the War Against 
Terrorism. Under these circumstances, the combination of enemy combatant status with the lowered 
procedural protections of “basic process” presented the executive with a dangerous opportunity to 
hide the FBI’s “Mayfield error” through indefinite detention. Mayfield’s liberty would then rely on 
the political expediency of his release, a legal nightmare that habeas corpus was intended to prevent. 
 189. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648-49. 
 190. Pfander, supra note 156, at 759. 
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factually similar, if not identical, situations in drastically different 
ways,191 an aberration not corrected by Hamdi. Although Hamdi created 
some limitations on the power that the executive had enjoyed since 2001, 
the decision does not establish much set procedure that the government is 
required to follow. Thus, the executive is still allowed to pursue the 
course of action most advantageous to its policies without regard for the 
implications those acts have on the individual liberty interests of detained 
American citizens. As a result, Mr. Lindh, captured in Afghanistan, was 
given counsel, and prosecuted criminally, whereas Mr. Hamdi, also 
captured in Afghanistan, was held incommunicado indefinitely. 
Likewise, Mr. Padilla, captured in a U.S. airport, was also held 
incommunicado indefinitely. Unlike Lindh and Hamdi, Mr. Padilla was 
not captured in a foreign combat zone in possession of weapons, but, like 
Milligan, was captured on U.S. territory at a time when the civilian 
courts were open and habeas corpus had not been suspended. 
Before Hamdi the executive claimed complete discretion to treat 
these citizen detainees as it wished—clearly a circumstance the 
Constitution was designed to prevent. Hamdi does little to remedy this 
for a detainee appearing in a court that tends to favor heavily the 
government’s security interests, like the Fourth Circuit. 
Further evidence of this flaw is found in the considerably divergent 
lower federal court rulings on Mr. Hamdi’s petition,192 and in other 
enemy combatant cases in which conflicting constitutional 
interpretations have led to very different results.193 The Mathews 
balancing test does nothing to cure these disparate outcomes. 
Consequently, two habeas petitioners in the same situation, making the 
same arguments, are likely to face very different outcomes depending on 
how their respective courts employ the Mathews test. Disparate outcomes 
are certainly possible with any subjective test that is applied differently 
by different courts. However, the freedom from unjustified and indefinite 
detention that is so fundamental to our liberal tradition cannot be served 
 191. E.g., compare Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (where Mr. Hamdi was detained as an enemy 
combatant) with United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002) (where a detainee of 
identical circumstances, i.e. a U.S. citizen captured as an enemy combatant on the field of battle in 
Afghanistan, was prosecuted under normal criminal procedure); see also Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2554 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing to the difference between Lindh’s treatment and Hamdi’s). 
 192. See supra Part II.B for the disparity between the decisions of the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit. 
 193. Compare Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
Government’s security interests so outweighed Mr. Hamdi’s liberty interests as to make one hearsay 
document sufficient to justify indefinite detention), vacated, 124 S. Ct. 2633, with Padilla v. 
Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the president’s inherent war powers did not 
extend to cover the detention of an American citizen as an enemy combatant, and, further, that the 
AUMF did not satisfy the Non-Detention Act’s requirement of express congressional authorization 
to detain American citizens at all), rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). 
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by such a test. Habeas corpus requires bright-line rules and their strict 
application as advocated, for example, by Justice Scalia’s dissent.194
The disparity between outcomes for similar petitioners that results 
from the differing rules of men is what the rule of law has always sought 
to avoid. Professor Brooks observed: 
 
[L]egal rules that were designed to protect basic rights and vulnerable 
groups have lost much of their analytical force, and thus, too often, 
their practical force. 
 The erosion of clear boundaries in some areas of the law also leads 
to a slippery slope, allowing the disingenuous to assert that there is also 
blurriness even in areas of the law that remain both relevant and clear. 
Thus, lawyers for the Bush administration went from the legitimate 
conclusion that the Geneva Conventions cannot easily be applied to 
many modern conflicts, to the disingenuous and flawed conclusion that 
there were therefore no legal constraints at all on U.S. interrogation 
practices. In fact, regardless of whether or not the Geneva Conventions 
apply to a given conflict, and regardless of whether or not a particular 
detainee is entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions, 
international law and U.S. treaty commitments prohibit the use of 
torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of 
detainees—and there can be little doubt that many of the interrogation 
practices authorized by the Pentagon constitute torture or cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment. In practice, then, the breakdown of 
clear boundaries in some areas of the law also dangerously undermines 
the efficacy of other legal rules.195
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Times of national crisis like the War Against Terrorism require 
bright-line rules that enforce the pre-defined, proper boundaries of 
government action, especially executive action. Such times are not 
appropriate for judicial improvisation or innovation because the stakes 
are high and judgment is often clouded by passion, patriotism, fear, or 
powerful desires for governmental strength and efficiency. 
 
[T]he war against terrorism is fundamentally different than any 
previous conflict this nation has fought . . . . [I]t is clear that there will 
never be a negotiated surrender in the war against terrorism and that the 
 194. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2660-74. 
 195. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law 
of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 681-82 (2004). 
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terrorist threat is unlikely to end anytime soon. We do not have the 
luxury, therefore, of regarding any restrictions on liberty as temporary 
expedients, like wartime rationing. Instead, such restrictions must be 
regarded as potentially permanent transformations in America’s 
constitutional value system. At a bare minimum, that suggests the need 
for closer judicial and political scrutiny . . . .196
 
If civil liberties are to be sacrificed temporarily in the name of 
greater security, then that decision must be made by elected 
representatives of the people with the constitutional power and political 
responsibility assigned to them. That process would create a temporary 
congressional measure that could be repealed when the crisis is over, or 
if the measure is found to be excessive or insufficient. Instead, we now 
have precedent that weakens the structural protections of the Constitution 
firmly rooted in the law. 
Where the legislature remains silent, there the writ of habeas corpus 
should speak against executive detention. Authorization to detain 
American citizens should not be implied. If there is no explicit detention 
authority granted and if the Suspension Clause has not been invoked, 
then the writ of habeas corpus demands either prosecution under existing 
legislated offenses or release. The American people should not have to 
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